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Abstract
This work-in-progress focuses on the refinement of application of the intensional logic to cyber-
forensic analysis and its benefits are compared with the finite-state automata approach. This work
extends the use of the scientific intensional programming paradigm onto modeling and implementa-
tion of a cyberforensics investigation process with the backtrace of event reconstruction, modeling
the evidence as multidimensional hierarchical contexts, and proving or disproving the claims with
it in the intensional manner of evaluation. This is a practical, context-aware improvement over the
finite state automata (FSA) approach we have seen in the related works. As a base implementation
language model we use in this approach is a new dialect of the Lucid programming language, that
we call Forensic Lucid and in this paper we focus on defining hierarchical contexts based on the
intensional logic for the evaluation of cyberforensic expressions.
Keywords: intensional logic, intensional programming, cyberforensics, Forensic Lucid, Lucid, finite-
state automata
1 Introduction
Problem Statement. The first formal approach for event reconstruction cyberforensic analysis ap-
peared in two papers [1, 2] by Gladyshev et al. that relies on the finite-state automata (FSA) and their
transformation and operation to model evidence, witnesses, stories told by witnesses, and their possible
evaluation. One of the examples the papers present is the use-case for the proposed technique – Black-
mail Investigation. We aim at the same case to model and implement it using the new approach, which
promises to be more friendly and usable in the actual investigator’s work and serve as a basis to further
development in the area.
Proposed Solution. We intend to show the intensional approach with a Lucid-based dialect to the
problem is an asset in the field of cyberforensics as it is promising to be more practical and usable
than the FSA. Since Lucid was originally designed and used to prove correctness of programming lan-
guages [3, 4], and is based on the temporal logic, functional and data-flow languages its implementation
to backtracking in proving or disproving the evidential statements and claims in the investigation process
as a evaluation of an expression that either evaluates to true or false given all the facts in the formally
specified context. We will also attempt to retain the generality of the approach vs. building a problem-
specific FSA in the FSA approach that can suffer a state explosion problem.
From the logic perspective, it was shown one can model computations (the basic unit in the finite state
machines in [1, 2]) as logic [5]. When armed with contexts as first-class values and a demand-driven
model adopted in the implementation of the Lucid-family of languages [6, 7, 8, 9, 10] that limits the
scope of evaluation in a given set of dimensions, we come to the intensional logic and the corresponding
programming artifact. In the essence, we model our forensic computation unit in the intensional logic and
propose the ways to implement it in practice within an intensional programming platform [11, 6, 12, 8].
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We see a lot of potential for this work to be successful and beneficial for cyberforensics as well as
intensional programming communities.
Based on the parameters and terms defined in the papers [1, 2], we have various pieces of evidence
and witnesses telling their own stories of the incident. The goal is to put them together to make the
description of the incident as precise as possible. To show that a certain claim may be true, an investigator
has to show that there are some explanations of evidence that agrees with the claim. To disprove the
claim, the investigator has to show there is no explanation of evidence that agree with the claim [1]. The
authors of the FSA approach did a proof-of-concept implementation of the algorithms in CMU Common
LISP [1] that we target to improve by re-writing in a Lucid dialect, that we call Forensic Lucid. In
this work we focus on the specification of hierarchical context expressions and the operators on them
when modeling the examples. LIPS, unlike Lucid, entirely lacks contexts build into its logic, syntax,
and semantics, thereby making the implementation of the cases more clumsy and inefficient (i.e. highly
sequential). Our system [11] (not discussed here) offers distributed demand-driven evaluation of Lucid
programs in a more efficient way and is more general than LISP’s compiler and run-time environment.
Lucid Overview. Lucid [3, 4, 13, 14, 15] is a dataflow intensional and functional programming lan-
guage. In fact, it is a family of languages that are built upon intensional logic (which in turn can be un-
derstood as a multidimensional generalization of temporal logic) involving context and demand-driven
parallel computation model. A program written in some Lucid dialect is an expression that may have
subexpressions that need to be evaluated at certain context. Given the set of dimensions D = {dimi}
in which an expression varies, and a corresponding set of indexes or tags defined as placeholders over
each dimension, the context is represented as a set of <dimi : tagi> mappings and each variable in
Lucid, called often a stream, is evaluated in that defined context that may also evolve using context op-
erators [7, 9, 10, 16]. The generic version of Lucid, the General Intensional Programming Language
(GIPL) [17], defines two basic operators @ and # to navigate (switch and query) in the contextsP . The
GIPL is the first1 generic programming language of all intensional languages, defined by the means of
only two intensional operators @ and #. It has been proven that other intensional programming languages
of the Lucid family can be translated into the GIPL [17].
1.1 General Intensional Programming System (GIPSY).
The GIPSY [18, 11, 19, 20, 12, 21, 22, 6, 8] is a platform implemented primarily in Java to investigate
properties of the Lucid family of languages and beyond. It executes Lucid programs following a demand-
driven distributed generator-worker architecture, and is designed as a modular collection of frameworks
where components related to the development (RIPE2), compilation (GIPC3), and execution (GEE4) of
Lucid programs are separated allowing easy extension, addition, and replacement of the components.
This is a proposed testing and investigation platform for our Forensic Lucid language.
2 Forensic Lucid Overview
This section summarizes concepts and considerations in the design of the Forensic Lucid language,
which is being studied through another use-case than related works [23, 24]. The end goal is to define
our Forensic Lucid language where its constructs concisely express cyberforensic evidence as context
1The second being Lucx [9, 10, 16]
2Run-time Integrated Programming Environment, implemented in gipsy.RIPE
3General Intensional Programming Compiler, implemented in gipsy.GIPC
4General Eduction Engine, implemented in gipsy.GEE
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of evaluations, which can be initial state of the case towards what we have actually observed as a final
state in the FSM. The implementing system [6, 11, 12, 8] backtraces intermediate results to provide the
corresponding event reconstruction path if it exists (which we do not discuss in this work). The result of
the expression in its basic form is either true or false, i.e. “guilty” or “not guilty” given the evidential
evaluation context per explanation with the backtrace. There can be multiple backtraces, that correspond
to the explanation of the evidence (or lack thereof).
Properties. We define Forensic Lucid to model the evidential statements and other expressions rep-
resenting the evidence and observations as context. An execution trace of a running Forensic Lucid
program is designed to expose the possibility of the proposed claim with the events that lead to the con-
clusion. Forensic Lucid aggregates the features of multiple Lucid dialects mentioned earlier needed for
these tasks along with its own extensions. The addition of the context calculus from Lucx (stands for
“Lucid enriched with context” that promotes contexts as first-class values) for operators on simple con-
texts and context sets (union, intersection, etc.) are used to manipulate complex hierarchical context
spaces in Forensic Lucid. Additionally, Forensic Lucid inherits many of the properties of Lucx, Objective
Lucid, JOOIP (Java-embedded Object-Oriented Intensional Programming language), and their compris-
ing dialects, where the former is for the context calculus, and the latter for the arrays and structural
representation of data for modeling the case data structures such as events, observations, and groupings
of the related data, and so on. (We eliminate the OO-related aspects from this work as well as some
others to conserve space and instead focus on the context hierarchies, syntax, and semantics.) Hierar-
chical contexts are also following the example of MARFL [25] using a dot operator and by overloading
@ and # to accept different types as their left and right arguments. One of the basic requirements is
that the final target definition of the syntax, and the operational semantics of Forensic Lucid should be
compatible with the basic Lucx and GIPL. This is necessary for compiler and and the run time system
within the implementing system, called General Intensional Programming System (GIPSY) [6, 11, 8].
The translation rules or equivalent are to be provided when implementing the language compiler within
GIPSY, and such that the run-time environment (General Eduction Engine, or GEE) can execute it with
minimal changes to GEE’s implementation.
Context. We need to provide an ability to encode the stories told by the evidence and witnesses. This
will constitute the context of evaluation. The return value of the evaluation would be a collection of
backtraces, which contain the “paths of truth”. If a given trace contains all truths values, it’s an expla-
nation of a story. If there is no such a path, i.e. the trace, there is no enough supporting evidence of the
entire claim to be true.
The context for this task for simplicity of the prototype language can be expressed as integers or
strings, to which we attribute some meaning or description. The contexts are finite and can be navigated
through in both directions of the index, potentially allowing negative tags in our tag sets of dimensions.
Concurrently, our contexts can be a finite set of symbolic labels and their values that can internally be
enumerated. The symbolic approach is naturally more appropriate for humans and we have a machinery
to so in Lucx’s implementation in GIPSY [26, 10]. We define streams of observations as our context,
that can be a simple context or a context set. In fact, in Forensic Lucid we are defining higher-level
dimensions and lower-level dimensions. The highest-level one is the evidential statement, which is
a finite unordered set of observation sequences. The observation sequence is a finite ordered set of
observations. The observation is an “eyewitness” of a particular property along with the duration of the
observation. As in the FSA [2, 1], the observations are tuples of (P,min,opt) in their generic form. The
observations in this form, specifically, the property P can be exploded further into Lucx’s context set
and further into an atomic simple context [16, 7]. Context switching between different observations is
3
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done naturally with the Lucid @ context switching operator. Consider some conceptual expression of a
storyboard in Listing 1 where anything in [ ... ] represents a story, i.e. the context of evaluation. foo
can be evaluated at multiple contexts (stories), producing a collection of final results (e.g. true or false)
for each story as well as a collection of traces.
foo @
{
[ f i n a l o b s e r v e d even t , p o s s i b l e i n i t i a l o b s e r v e d e v e n t ] ,
[ ] ,
[ ]
}
Listing 1: Intensional Storyboard Expression
While the [...] notation here may be confusing with respect to the notation of [dimension:tag]
in Lucid and more specifically in Lucx [16, 10, 7], it is in fact a simple syntactical extension to allow
higher-level groups of contexts where this syntactical sugar is later translated to the baseline context
constructs. The tentative notation of {[...],...,[...]} implies a notion similar to the notion of
the “context set” in [16, 7, 10] except with the syntactical sugar mentioned earlier where we allow
syntactical grouping of properties, observations, observation sequences, and evidential statements as our
context sets. The generic observation sequence [1] can be expanded into the context stream using the
min and opt values, where they will translate into index values. Thus, obs = (A,3,0)(B,2,0) expands
the property labels A and B into a finite stream of five indexed elements: AAABB. Thus, a Forensic Lucid
fragment in Listing 2 would return the third A of the AAABB context stream in the observation portion of
o. Therefore, possible evaluations to check for the properties can be as shown in Figure 1.
/ / Give me o b s e r v e d p r o p e r t y a t i n d e x 2 i n t h e o b s e r v a t i o n s e q u e n c e obs
o @. obs 2
where
/ / Higher− l e v e l d i m e n s i o n i n t h e form o f ( P , min , o p t )
o b s e r v a t i o n o ;
/ / E q u i v a l e n t t o w r i t i n g = { A , A , A , B , B } ;
o b s e r v a t i o n s e q u e n c e obs = (A, 3 , 0 ) (B , 2 , 0 ) ;
where
/ / P r o p e r t i e s A and B are a r r a y s o f c o m p u t a t i o n s
/ / or any E x p r e s s i o n s
A = [ c1 , c2 , c3 , c4 ] ;
B = E ;
. . .
end ;
end ;
Listing 2: Observation Sequence With Duration
The property values of A and B can be anything that context calculus allows. The observation
sequence is a finite ordered context tag set [10] that allows an integral “duration” of a given tag property.
This may seem like we allow duplicate tag values that are unsound in the classical Lucid semantics;
however, we find our way around little further in the text with the implicit tag index. The semantics of
the arrays of computations is not a part of either GIPL or Lucx; however, the arrays are provided by
JLucid and Objective Lucid. We need the notion of the arrays to evaluate multiple computations at the
same context. Having an array of computations is conceptually equivalent of running an a Lucid program
under the same context for each array element in a separate instance of the evaluation engine and then the
4
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results of those expressions are gathered in one ordered storage within the originating program. Arrays in
Forensic Lucid are needed to represent a set of results, or explanations of evidential statements, as well
as denote some properties of observations. We will explore the notion of arrays in Forensic Lucid much
greater detail in the near future work. In the FSA approach computations ci correspond to the state q and
event i that enable transition. For Forensic Lucid, we can have ci as theoretically any Lucid expression
E.
Observed property (context): A A A B B
Sub-dimension index: 0 1 2 3 4
o @.obs 0 = A
o @.obs 1 = A
o @.obs 2 = A
o @.obs 3 = B
o @.obs 4 = B
To get the duration/index position:
o @.obs A = 0 1 2
o @.obs B = 3 4
Figure 1: Handling Duration of an Observed Property in the Context
In Figure 1 we are illustrating a possibility to query for the sub-dimension indices by raw property
where it persists that produces a finite stream valid indices that can be used in subsequent expressions,
or, alternatively by supplying the index we can get the corresponding raw property at that index. The
latter feature is still under investigation of whether it is safe to expose it to Forensic Lucid programmers
or make it implicit at all times at the implementation level. This is needed to remedy the problem of
“duplicate tags”: as previously mentioned, observations form the context and allow durations. This
means multiple duplicate dimension tags with implied subdimension indexes should be allowed as the
semantics of a traditional Lucid approaches do not allow duplicate dimension tags. It should be noted
however, that the combination of the tag and its index in the stream is still unique and can be folded into
the traditional Lucid semantics.
Transition Function. A transition function (described at length [1, 2] and the derived works) deter-
mines how the context of evaluation changes during computation. A general issue exists that we have to
address is that the transition function ψ is usually problem-specific. In the FSA approach, the transition
function is the labeled graph itself. In the first prototype, we follow the graph to model our Forensic
Lucid equivalent. In general, Lucid has already basic operators to navigate and switch from one context
to another, which represent the basic transition functions in themselves (the intensional operators such
as @, #, iseod, first, next, fby, wvr, upon, and asa as well as their inverse operators5). However,
a specific problem being modeled requires more specific transition function than just plain intensional
operators. In this case the transition function is a Forensic Lucid function where the matching state
transition modeled through a sequence of intensional operators. A question arises a of how to explicitly
model the transition function ψ and its backtraceΨ−1 in the new language. A possible approach is to use
predefined macros in Lucid syntax [27]. In fact, the forensic operators are just pre-defined functions that
rely on the traditional and inverse Lucid operators as well as context switching operators that achieve
5Defined further
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something similar to the transitions. At the implementation level, it is the GEE that actually does the
execution of ψ within GIPSY. In fact, the intensional operators of Lucid represent the basic building
blocks for ψ and Ψ−1.
Operational Semantics. As previously mentioned, the operational semantics of Forensic Lucid for
the large part is viewed as a composition of the semantic rules of GIPL, Objective Lucid, and Lucx
along with the new operators and definitions. The explanation of the rules and the notation are given in
great detail in the cited works and are trimmed in this extended abstract due to shortage of space. The
Objective Lucid semantic rules were affected and refined by some of the semantic rules of JOOIP [28].
We also omit the Objective Lucid and JOOIP semantic rules due to space limitation and defer them
to another publication. The new rules of the operational semantics of Forensic Lucid cover the newly
defined operators primarily, including the reverse and logical stream operators as well as forensic-specific
operators. Refining the semantics of context set operators of Lucx, such as box and range are also a part
of this work. We use the same notation as the referenced languages to maintain consistency in defining
our rules.
3 Initial Blackmail Case Modeling
Figure 2: Cluster Data with the Blackmail Fragments
The case description in this section is from [2]. A managing director of some company, Mr. C,
was blackmailed. He contacted the police and handed them evidence in the form of a floppy disk that
contained a letter with a number of allegations, threats, and demands. The message was known to have
come from his friend Mr. A. The police officers went to interview Mr. A and found that he was on
holiday abroad. They seized the computer of Mr. A and interviewed him as soon as he returned into the
country. Mr. A admitted that he wrote the letter, but denied making threats and demands. He explained
that, while he was on holiday, Mr. C had access to his computer. Thus, it was possible that Mr. C added
the threats and demands into the letter himself to discredit Mr. A. One of the blackmail fragments was
found in the slack space of another letter unconnected with the incident. When the police interviewed the
person to whom that letter was addressed, he confirmed that he had received the letter on the day that Mr.
A had gone abroad on holiday. It was concluded that Mr. A must have added the threats and demands
into the letter before going on holiday, and that Mr. C could not have been involved. In Figure 2 is the
initial view of the incident as a diagram illustrating cluster data of the blackmail and unconnected letters.
Modeling the Investigation. In the blackmail example, the functionality of the last cluster of a file
was used to determine the sequence of events and, hence, to disprove Mr. A’s alibi. Thus, the scope of
the model can be restricted to the functionality of the last cluster in the unrelated file. The last cluster
model can store data objects of only three possible lengths: LENGT H = {0,1,2}. Zero length means
that the cluster is unallocated. The length of 1 means that the cluster contains the object of the size of
6
Automated Deduction in Blackmail Case Analysis with Forensic Lucid Mokhov et al.
Simplified model of the cluster:
possible data lengths: 0 1 2
LEFT PART RIGHT PART
possible data values: u – unrelated
t1 – threats-obscured part t2 – threats in slack
o1 – other data left part o2 – other data right part
Observed final state:
LENGT H = 1 (u) unrelated (t2) threats in slack
LEFT PART = {u, t1,o1}
RIGHT PART = {t2,o2}
Q = LENGT H×LEFT PART ×RIGHT PART
Figure 3: Simplified Cluster Model
the unrelated letter tip. The length of 2 means that the cluster contains the object of the size of the data
block with the threats. In Figure 3 is, therefore, the simplified model of the investigation.
Events. The state of the last cluster can be changed by three types of events:
1. Ordinary writes into the cluster:
WRIT E = {(u),(t1),(o1),(u, t2),(u,o2),(t1, t2),(t1,o2),(o1, t2),(o1,o2)}
2. Direct writes into the file to which the cluster is allocated (bypassing the OS):
DIRECT WRIT E = {d(u, t2),d(u,o2),d(o1),d(t1, t2),d(t1,o2),d(o1, t2),d(o1,o2)}
3. Deletion of the file which sets the length of the file to zero:
I =WRIT E
⋃
DIRECT WRIT E
⋃{del}
Formalization of the Evidence. The final state observed by the investigators is (1,u, t2). Let O f inal
denote the observation of this state. The entire sequence of observations is then os f inal = ($,O f inal). The
observation sequence osunrelated says that the unrelated letter was created at some time in the past, and
that it was received by the person to whom it was addressed is osunrelated = ($,Ounrelated ,$,(CT ,0,0),$)
where Ounrelated denotes the observation that the “unrelated” letter tip (u) is being written into the cluster.
The evidential statement is then: esblackmail = (os f inal,osunrelated).
Finding an Explanation of Mr. A’s Theory. Mr. A’s theory, encoded using the proposed notation, is
osMr.A = ($,Ounrelated−clean,$,Oblackmail,$), where Ounrelated−clean denotes the observation that the “un-
related” letter (u) is being written into the cluster and, at the same time, the cluster does not contain the
blackmail fragment; Oblackmail denotes the observation that the right part of the model now contains the
blackmail fragment (t2).
Explanations. There are two most logically possible explanations that can be represented by state
machine. See the corresponding state diagram for the blackmail case in Figure 4.
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Figure 4: Blackmail Case State Machine
1. The first explanation:
. . .
(u)−→ (1,u,o2) (u,t2)−−−→ (2,u, t2) (u)−→ (1,u, t2)
• Finding the unrelated letter, which was written by Mr. A earlier;
• Adding threats into the last cluster of that letter by editing it “in-place” with a suitable text
editor (such as ViM [29]);
• Restoring the unrelated letter to its original content by editing it “in-place” again.
“To understand this sequence of events, observe that certain text editors (e.g. ViM
[29]) can be configured to edit text “in-place”. In this mode of operation, the
modified file is written back into the same disk blocks that were allocated to the
original file. As a result, the user can forge the file’s slack space by (1) appending
the desired slack space content to the end of the file, (2) saving it, (3) reverting the
file back to the original content, (4) saving it again.” [2]
2. The second explanation:
. . .
(u)−→ (1,u,o2) d(u,t2)−−−→ (1,u, t2)
• The threats are added into the slack space of the unrelated letter by writing directly into the
last cluster using, for example, a low-level disk editor.
The blackmail case example of the initial implementation steps is in Listing 3.
4 Conclusion
The proposed practical approach in the cyberforensics field can also be used in a normal investigation
process involving crimes not necessarily associated with information technology. Combined with an
expert system (e.g. implemented in CLIPS [30]), it can also be used in training new staff in investigation
techniques. The focus on hierarchical contexts as first-class values brings more understanding of the
process to the investigators in cybercrime case management tools.
Future Work.
• Forensic Lucid Compiler and run-time environment.
• Prove equivalence to the FSA approach.
• Adapt/re-implement a graphical UI based on the data-flow graph tool [31] to simplify Forensic
Lucid programming for not very tech-savvy investigators.
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MrA @ es mra
where
e v i d e n t i a l s t a t e m e n t e s mra = {os mra , o s f i n a l , o s u n r e l a t e d } ;
o b s e r v a t i o n s e q u e n c e os mra = ( $ , o u n r e l a t e d c l e a n , $ , o b l a c k m a i l , $ ) ;
o b s e r v a t i o n s e q u e n c e o s f i n a l = ( $ , o f i n a l ) ;
o b s e r v a t i o n s e q u e n c e o s u n r e l a t e d = ( $ , o u n r e l a t e d , $ , ( Ct , 0 , 0 ) , $ ) ;
o b s e r v a t i o n o f i n a l = ( 1 , ” u ” , ” t 2 ” ) ;
o b s e r v a t i o n o u n r e l a t e d c l e a n = ( 1 , ” u ” , ” o1 ” ) ;
/ / . . .
i n v t r a n s (Q, es mra , o f i n a l ) = b a c k r a c e s
where
/ / l i s t o f a l l p o s s i b l e d i m e n s i o n s
o b s e r v a t i o n Q = l e n g t h s box l e f t p a r t box r i g h t p a r t ;
/ / e v e n t s
o b s e r v a t i o n l e n g t h s = u n o r d e r e d {0 , 1 , 2} ;
/ / s y m b o l i c l a b e l s map t o human d e s c r i p t i o n s
o b s e r v a t i o n l e f t p a r t = u n o r d e r e d {
” u ” => ” u n r e l a t e d ” ,
” t 1 ” => ” t h r e a t s −o b s c u r e d p a r t ” ,
” o1 ” => ” o t h e r d a t a ( l e f t p a r t ) ”
} ;
o b s e r v a t i o n r i g h t p a r t = u n o r d e r e d {
” t 2 ” => ” t h r e a t s i n s l a c k ” ,
” o2 ” => ” o t h e r d a t a ( r i g h t p a r t ) ”
} ;
b a c k t r a c e s = [ A, B , C , D, ] ;
where
. . .
end ;
end ;
end ;
Listing 3: Blackmail Case Modeling in Forensic Lucid
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